The Kyoto Protocol (KP) is considered a necessary first step towards an effective future climate accord. As argued in this paper, however, the KP will likely fail because it has too many loopholes, inadequate governance structures and insufficient compliance provisions. This view is supported by case studies of Canada, Japan and the Netherlands. These countries are unlikely to achieve their self-imposed targets, or, if they do, the costs of compliance will be unacceptably high. Consequently, the difficulty of achieving agreement to reduce global emissions by half (as required to mitigate climate change) is greatly increased.
INTRODUCTION
While the full extent of the potential damages from global warming remains unknown, scientists have argued that action should be taken to mitigate the potentially adverse consequences of global warming. Therefore, policy measures that the global community undertakes to address climate change are important, and any international agreements that are struck should at least achieve their outcomes. Failure in this regard may be detrimental to future attempts to negotiate meaningful reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases.
In this paper, I argue that the Kyoto Protocol (KP) is an example of an international agreement that should never have been undertaken because too many ratifying countries, let alone ones that have refused to ratify (such as the United States and Australia), will not achieve their self-assigned targets, despite the availability of Kyoto's flexibility mechanisms. Further, the KP fails to address the environmental externality because it permits countries to claim emission reduction credits that are not additional; they are ephemeral and make no contribution towards climate change mitigation (Chomitz 2000; Marland et al. 2002) . Finally, because real-world mitigation relies on governance structures that are inefficient and costly, this greatly reduces the appetite for more stringent emission reductions in the future. The Marrakech Accords essentially permit countries to offset any carbon released (debited) as a result of timber harvests and land conversion -at least up to 9.0 Mt C per year. In addition, some countries are able to claim automatic carbon credits from business-as-usual forest management that need not be offset against carbon released as a result of LULUCF activities.
Canada can claim 12 Mt C per year, the Russian Federation 33 Mt C, Japan 13 Mt C, and other countries much lesser amounts -Germany 1.24 Mt C, Ukraine 1.11 Mt C, and remaining countries less than 1.0 Mt C. None of these activities can be considered additional in the sense that they specifically address climate change. Countries receive credit for activities that they would undertake in any event.
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ACHIEVING KYOTO PROTOCOL TARGETS
Economists generally identify three governance structures for mitigating environmental externalities such as rising atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 : (1) command and control (C&C), or regulation and standards; (2) common values and norms; and (3) market incentives. Common values and norms are intermediary between the "extremes" of the market and C&C (Loasby 1990; Stavins 2002) . Common values and norms include voluntary measures, moral suasion and education, and may be accompanied by subsidies. Common values and norms develop more easily in a homogeneous society like the Netherlands, while markets are more appropriate in a heterogeneous society such as Germany (CPB 1997, 42-44) .
Market incentives include a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade scheme, where tradable emission permits (quotas) can be allocated to existing emitters of CO 2 at no cost to them (referred to as "grandfathering") or sold via an auction, thereby generating revenue for the government. Under a market scheme, an economic agent has the option of reducing emissions by paying a penalty in the form of a tax or permit purchase. The choice will depend on the agent's costs of reducing emissions. Those firms with the greatest ability to reduce emissions at lowest cost will sell (excess) emission reduction permits to those firms least able to reduce emissions, with all firms reducing emissions to the point where the marginal costs of reducing emissions further equals the tax or the price of permits. The problem with C&C is that, while in principle enabling a country to achieve its KP target, the intervention often leads to policy failure and much higher costs than with a market instrument. Market incentives are clearly more efficient (less costly) for achieving KP targets than C&C (Stavins 2002; Field and Olewiler 2002) .
While market instruments are preferred, economic efficiency implications are not the same for all market instruments. When abatement costs and/or benefits are uncertain, picking a carbon tax (price) can lead to the "wrong" level of emissions reduction, while choosing a quantity can result in a mistake about the forecasted price that firms will have to pay for permits (Weitzman 1974) . Such errors have social costs. If the marginal cost of abatement rises sharply with the degree of abatement while marginal damages are relatively constant over a wide range of abatement levels, and if there is uncertainty about the magnitude of both, then the costs of using marketable permits are higher than the costs of carbon taxes (Pizer 1997) . Once a quantity instrument is chosen over a tax internationally, individual countries are also better off adopting a quantity instrument so long as they are able to purchase emission reduction permits abroad.
It has also been shown that taxes and auctioned permits are preferred to grandfathered permits because, if tax revenue or revenue from sale of permits is used to reduce tax distortions elsewhere in the economy as opposed to being recycled in lump sum fashion, there might be a "double-dividend" that reduces the overall cost of achieving the KP target (Parry et al. 1999; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996) . However, grandfathering of permits is likely to be more politically acceptable, even though it raises costs.
The problem is that the Kyoto process began with emission reduction targets and only afterwards began to consider instruments for implementation. Rather than using a true cap-andtrade scheme that allocates emission "rights" (permits) equal to emissions cap and then allows permit trading, a credit trading scheme was adopted (Tietenberg et al. 1998) . Credit trading occurs when the government mandates that firms (usually large industrial emitters) each reduce emissions by a certain amount (generally expressed as a proportion of baseline emissions) and then allows firms that reduce emissions below the required level to receive credits that can be sold to firms that cannot meet their targets. Nothing prevents emissions from growing because, for example, new firms can enter as the economy expands. But Kyoto permitted other forms of credits that could be traded (substituted) for emission reduction credits, thereby enabling countries and/or companies to achieve targets without addressing emissions per se.
Annex B countries can achieve their CO 2 -reduction targets in different ways.
• Countries can simply reduce own emissions of CO 2 to the target level.
• A country can achieve part (or all) of its KP target by sequestering carbon in domestic terrestrial ecosystems. It can obtain credits (up to 9 Mt C per year) for activities that reduce carbon release from net land-use change and forestry if it had net LULUCF emissions in 1990 (Article 3.7); claim unlimited net removals by sinks as a result of afforestation and reforestation activities that are truly additional (Article 3.3); demand unlimited net removals by changes in agronomic practices (cropland and grazing land management, and revegetation actions) under Article 3.4; and claim limited removals as a result of forest management activities (Article 3.4), as set out by COP-7 (see above).
• Joint implementation (JI) allows an Annex B country to participate in an emissionsreduction or sink activity in another Annex B country (Article 6), thereby earning "emission reduction units" (ERUs) that are credited toward the country's own commitment.
• Under the "clean development mechanism" (CDM) of Article 12, an Annex B country can earn "certified emission reductions" (CERs) by funding emissions-reducing and/or sink projects in developing (non-Annex B) countries. Only afforestation and reforestation are permitted sink activities and their use is limited (in each year of the commitment period) to 1% of the Annex B country's base-year emissions, although this constraint is likely not binding.
• Finally, Annex B countries can simply purchase excess emission credits from other Annex B countries (Article 17). Emission credits in excess of what a country needs to achieve its commitment are referred to as "assigned amount units" (AAUs) that can be purchased by other countries. These are particularly important to economies in transition (EIT) that, because of economic decline during the 1990s, are thought to be able to exceed KP targets quite easily (Figure 1 ), thus having "hot air" (AAUs) available for sale.
The purchase and sale of AAUs, CERs and ERUs is referred to as "international emissions trading" (IET), although no true emissions trading currently exists.
The availability of a variety of emission-reduction and carbon sequestration options for achieving targets poses greater challenges for monitoring and enforcement than is the case with simple emissions reduction. In principle, enabling emitters to purchase carbon offsets in lieu of emission credits, and allowing Annex B countries to purchase credits from developing countries via the CDM, should reduce compliance costs relative to the situation where restrictions are placed only on emissions, because it should not matter how CO 2 is removed from the atmosphere. However, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to determine whether a terrestrial carbon sink activity is indeed additional. Further, mixed emission-offset carbon trading requires an exchange rate -a factor that converts temporary into permanent removal of CO 2 from the atmosphere. Although temporary carbon storage can be important (Marland et al. 2001, 262) , under Kyoto there is currently no effective penalty for releasing stored carbon after 2012. A country could claim carbon offset credits for each year of the commitment period, but, if the stored carbon is released immediately afterwards, climate change mitigation does not occur.
The ephemeral nature of terrestrial carbon uptake can be addressed by providing only partial credits for stored carbon according to the perceived risk that it will be released at some future date, or some assurance that the temporary activity will be followed by one that results in a permanent emissions reduction. Thus, providers of carbon offsets might be able to credit only a portion of the carbon sequestered in trees, or they have to post a bond and/or purchase an insurance contract. But this increases the transaction costs of establishing carbon sinks.
Alternatively, a conversion factor that translates years of temporary carbon storage into a permanent equivalent can be specified. For example, the IPCC (2000) has proposed the use of ton-years to address the conversion from temporary to permanent storage (with some 50-150 tonyears of storage equated to a ton of reduced emissions). Once a conversion factor has been decided upon, seamless exchange between carbon offset and emission reduction credits can occur in the marketplace. The ton-years approach reduces transaction costs of insurance and renewal contracts, and does away with the smoke and mirrors that currently characterizes the treatment of carbon sinks in the Kyoto process. However, the ton-year approach, as well as the other approaches mentioned, reduce the value of offset credits relative to emissions reductions, and will thus be opposed by countries seeking to use sinks as an "easy" means for achieving targets.
KYOTO PROTOCOL SMOKE AND MIRRORS
Proponents of the KP stress the perhaps symbolic importance of an international agreement on climate change, even if the measures do little to forestall global warming -the current agreement can serve as a building block for more aggressive emission controls in the future. The KP can be viewed in this way only if three conditions are satisfied. First, the costs of achieving the KP targets should not be onerous; otherwise, citizens and their leaders will oppose more stringent measures, preferring to take their chances on adaptation as a lower cost alternative. And compliance costs depend on the governance structures that a country adopts.
Second, the KP can only be considered a building block for future action if most countries meet their agreed-upon targets. Failure to meet these self-imposed objectives does not bode well for future agreements, with countries then unlikely to accept a future agreement that contains meaningful emissions reductions and meaningful penalties for non-compliance.
Finally, and perhaps worst of all, if countries use smoke and mirrors to meet their obligations but make no real effort to reduce CO 2 emissions, the international community will view future participation in agreements that permit some countries to escape meaningful climate mitigation action with skepticism, making it more difficult to reach an accord at some future date. At first blush, it is difficult to accept that the KP is nothing more than smoke and mirrors.
Two groups of countries, the economies in transition and the EU, currently have lower CO 2 -equivalent emissions than in 1990 (Figure 1 ), although the situation varies for individual EU countries (Table 1) . For economies in transition, lower emissions are an artifact of economic decline, and not policies to mitigate climate change.
<Insert Figure 1 about here> <Insert Table 1 about here> In this section, the implementation plans of Canada, Japan and the Netherlands are examined to determine whether these countries can achieve their emission targets without some creative carbon accounting, and whether targets can be achieved at least (or at least acceptable) cost. Concern for future generations and poor people threatened by global warming played a significant role in the decision by all three countries to ratify the KP. Therefore, it is important that these countries not only achieve their KP targets, but do so in a transparent and least cost fashion. Failure to achieve targets, use of smoke and mirrors to achieve targets, and/or high economic costs will have a detrimental effect on the political feasibility of future domestic and international efforts to mitigate climate change, and not just in those countries.
Canada
Canada considers itself to be a global leader in matters of the environment and dutifully ratified the KP on December 17, 2002. Altruism is an obvious motivating factor in Canada's decision, but absent effective implementation altruism can ring hollow in the international arena, and at home. How effective is Canada's implantation plan, and, more importantly, how costly is it likely to be? Canada committed to reduce emissions of CO 2 -equivalent gases by 6% from 1990 levels, or by some 240 Mt CO 2 per year during 2008-12 ( Figure 1 ). To achieve its targets at lowest cost, it should rely as much as possible on market incentives, but it should not rely on subsidies, for example, as these violate the "polluter-pays" principle by transferring the externality costs of CO 2 emissions from those who cause them to general taxpayers. In this sense, taxes and emissions/offset trading are preferred.
According to the federal government's implementation plan (Government of Canada 2002), C&C and voluntary action feature prominently, albeit accompanied by subsidies. Carbon taxes are hardly mentioned in the Canadian government's implementation plan, and the only example provided is a possible excise tax exemption for ethanol in gasoline. The role of emissions trading is limited to about 30% of the required reduction, with a minimum of 10 Mt CO 2 to be obtained internationally and the remainder domestically through a combination of emissions reductions and carbon offset credits (Ibid., 42-44). The plan also makes reference to covenants (e.g., contracting farmers to plant shelterbelts) and regulations/standards, with the latter used to ensure that sectors meet their KP targets. Some sectors have been exempted, most notably the automotive sector in Ontario because of its integral tie to the U.S. automotive sector.
The government also announced that Canadian industry would not be required to reduce emissions below 15% of business-as-usual (projected) emissions intensity (CO 2 emissions per unit of output), as this objective is easily attainable.
Further, there is to be a cap on the price that is to be paid for emission reduction permits and carbon offsets of C$15 per t CO 2 , based on the notion that emission reduction permits can be purchased internationally at that price or less. If costs exceed $15, the government will need to subsidize the difference -and that amount could be substantial. Estimates of the likely costs of reducing CO 2 emissions range from a low of US$7.91 (about C$12) per t CO 2 under full global trading to US$21.27 (C$32) per t CO 2 if trading is limited to Annex B countries (IPCC 2001, It is difficult to determine precisely how Canada will achieve its KP targets based on the government's implementation plan, although it is possible to draw some conclusions. As indicated in Table 2 , actions already underway (as a result of Action Plan 2000 and the 2001
Federal Budget) are to account for about one-third of the required emissions reduction (about 80
Mt CO 2 per year), although it is unclear whether and how the targets will be met. New actions are to account for an additional 100 Mt CO 2 reduction in emissions (or increase in carbon sequestration), while the remaining 60 Mt is to be addressed in some other (unknown) fashion at some time prior to 2008.
<Insert Table 2about here>
The government believes that individuals and all levels of government will take action to reduce emissions by driving less, setting thermostats lower, enhancing insulation of buildings, and so on (see McKitrick and Wigle 2002) . Just over half of the needed emission reductions are projected to be the result of reduced fossil fuel consumption and energy efficiency improvements in the industrial sectors. The government's plan also calls for some 58-66 Mt CO 2 annually of terrestrial carbon offsets to be created, but it is not clear how (and if) this will occur given that the $15 per t CO 2 limit that firms are required to pay is less than it will cost to create offsets.
Further, although it is not clear how the 60 Mt CO 2 in Step 3 will come about, this category includes the government's claim of 70 Mt CO 2 for clean energy exports (which the international community has already rejected because these credit Canada for fuel switching by U.S. firms), 7
Mt CO 2 due to the voluntary actions of Canadians (another 24 Mt CO 2 is claimed in
Step 2), and 10 Mt CO 2 by one hundred communities that have plans.
In Table 3 , I indicate how actions are likely to be allocated. The government plans to employ subsidies to bring about a 35% reduction in required emissions, terrestrial carbon sinks are to account for 25%, voluntary action is projected to reduce emissions by 20% of the amount needed, and other actions are to account for the remainder. Clean energy exports act as a fudge factor that will enable Canada to undershoot its target by nearly 30% and still claim to be in compliance. According to the implementation plan, domestic and international emissions trading are to account for 10% of the KP target (with any sink carbon in excess of 38 Mt CO 2 to come from domestic emissions trading), but international emissions trading could play a larger role for reasons indicated above. Overall, the 2002 plan is dominated by inefficient instruments, many of which have a dubious effect on CO 2 emissions and/or lack a means (tax, subsidy, standard) for bringing them about.
<Insert Table 3 about here> My estimates of the potential cost to Canada of the current implementation plan are provided in the last column of of "extra" growth. In this sense, there is no cost to claiming this terrestrial carbon credit, but then there is no real increase in the amount of carbon stored in terrestrial carbon sinks either.
What about the other components of ongoing terrestrial activities? There is no automatic claim for them under the KP as there is with ongoing forest management activities, so it makes sense to estimate their costs. The costs of creating carbon credits are some $35 to over $100 per t CO 2 for Canadian agricultural sinks , implying an annual cost of some $630 million for such ongoing sink activities.
Direct subsidies of some $500 million annually are being set aside to fund programs and measures to reduce CO 2 emissions, although this likely underestimates the amount required (Government of Canada 2001, p.55; 2002, p.12) . The government claims that 50 Mt of CO 2 will be reduced this way, but careful examination of the implementation plan suggests that some 85
Mt of CO 2 are to be eliminated annually using subsidies. Thus, the needed subsidy would be $850 million per year instead of $500 million, which firms and individuals would spend on mitigating activities (see Table 3 ).
Carbon offset trading is expected to account for about half of the 55 Mt CO 2 to be addressed by market instruments. Given that this will be in addition to the terrestrial carbon sinks already underway (or planned for), costs of creating these additional credits will be significantly higher (due to higher marginal costs). Costs of creating offset credits are estimated to be some $963 million to $2,750 million per year. It is necessary to compare these costs against the leastcost alternative -buying emission reduction credits. Using IPCC (2001) data, the estimated cost of purchasing the same amount of emission reduction credits would be $410-$765 million per year, although this would be even lower if international trading could be exploited to a greater degree. In order for carbon offsets to be traded, however, the government will have to subsidize their creation, with the subsidy equal to the difference between purchase of emission reduction credits and the cost of creating carbon sink offsets, or some $0.6-$2.3 billion annually.
Finally, voluntary initiatives and clean energy export credits are assumed to be costless means of achieving emissions reductions, although this is unlikely to be the case in practice.
Firms and individuals will incur costs in order to purchase goodwill or utility from having done what is "right", but it is a cost nonetheless.
Overall, the costs to Canada of the government's implementation plan are here estimated to range conservatively from $2.9 billion to about $6.2 billion per year, or some $41 billion to $89 billion in discounted terms (using a 7% rate of discount). 4 This is somewhat higher than the $30 billion estimated by Kennedy (2002, p.31 ), but he assumed that market instruments and not regulations would be used to achieve Kyoto targets. The reason for the wide range of estimates is related to the uncertainty about the costs of creating terrestrial carbon sinks and the future price of tradable emission permits.
Suppose that the government relied solely on emissions trading to achieve the aforementioned reductions of 158 Mt CO 2 (excluding the 20 Mt CO 2 credit for ongoing forest management). The remainder is to be attained through voluntary measures and credits for clean energy exports. Assume that trading occurs at some $15-$30 per t CO 2 and that 75% of emissions are purchased domestically. In that case, the cost to Canada amounts to some $1.481-$2.963 billion annually, 5 still a significant sum but $1.4-$3.2 billion less than what it would be under the government's implementation plan. That is, reliance on emissions trading will reduce costs by at least half. The reason is that the government plan does not give firms and individuals the incentive to seek out the least cost means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Japan
Like Canada, Japan is committed to reducing its CO 2 -equivalent GHG emissions by 6% from Twelve percent of the targeted overall emissions reduction, or approximately 29 Mt CO 2 , will come from Kyoto's flexibility mechanisms, while the remainder (4 Mt CO 2 ) appear to be coming from domestic emissions trading.
<Insert Tables 4, 5 and 6 about here> A summary of the importance of various governance structures in achieving Japan's KP target is provided in Table 6 . Carbon taxes have been eschewed to maintain international competitiveness, and will not be implemented until there is international coordination of such taxes (Hayami et al. 2003) . Among market instruments subsidies play a dominant role, while command and control is also important. Although Japan's mix of governance structures is similar to that employed by Canada, common values and norms are likely to be more effective in Japan because it is a more homogeneous society. of Japan's required target is the result of offshore emissions trading and the remainder from domestic trading (at $82.64 per t CO 2 ), then the total cost to Japan will be some $17.5 billion per year. However, if voluntary measures are indeed successful (and there is more chance of their success in Japan than Canada for reasons already mentioned), costs would only be $12.2 billion annually. This is $2.3 billion less than if Japan were to rely solely on domestic measures (i.e., not rely on Kyoto's flexibility mechanism).
Not evident from
Although the annual cost of achieving the KP target appears to be quite high, the $12.2 billion per year estimate must be considered a lower bound estimate. The reasons are that, as argued for Canada, voluntary measures are unlikely to come about without social costs and, more importantly, the estimated annual cost assumes that market instruments are used to achieve the target. Again recall that regulations are more costly than market instruments for correcting environmental spillovers.
Japan is unlikely to meet its Kyoto obligation because any serious attempt to meet its KP obligation will result in costs that are unlikely to be politically acceptable (viz., building 20 nuclear power plants). Unfortunately, failure to achieve the required target or failure to control costs, or both, will lead to a negative Japanese attitude towards future climate negotiations, particularly if such negotiations attempt to implement emissions reductions on the scale called for by climate scientists.
The Netherlands
Although individual EU countries may have difficulty achieving their KP targets, the EU as a whole appears to be on course for meeting its KP obligations. This is the result of, among other things, aggressive energy pricing policies and sheer luck that has to do as much with the choice of base year as with policy: Inefficient coal mines and power generating facilities in Britain have closed down since 1990, while inefficient manufacturing industries in eastern Germany closed as a result of reunification. Thus, Britain and Germany have agreed to bear the greatest burden in achieving EU reductions (Table 1) . Since the Netherlands is a country that has experienced neither a large increase in CO 2 -equivalent greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 nor an opportunistic drop in emissions, it makes an interesting case study: If the Netherlands cannot achieve its KP target in straightforward and transparent fashion, it does not bode well for the current agreement or future ones.
The Netherlands ratified the Kyoto Protocol as a member of the EU on May 31, 2002.
While the EU's overall target is to reduce emissions by 7%, the Dutch negotiated a reduction of 6% within the EU (Table 1) Within the Netherlands, three "packages" have been proposed. The basic package is designed to reduce emissions by 25 Mt of CO 2 -equivalent greenhouse gases per year. A reserve package has been identified in case the basic package cannot achieve its goals, and an innovation package was developed with a focus on the future. The innovation package is designed to permit experimenting with emissions trading and, at the same time, encourage innovations that lead to the development of climate neutral energy carriers. For meeting the KP target, however, it is the basic package and the reserve package that are important.
The basic package involves a 70-30 split between measures aimed at reducing CO 2 emissions and those aimed at other greenhouse gases, including primarily non-CO 2 emissions from industrial sources and agriculture. CO 2 -equivalent reductions by sector are provided in Table 7 .
<Insert Table 7 about here> Unlike Canada and Japan, the Dutch implementation plan calls for greater reliance on markets as a governance structure, even though common values and norms are probably more effective in Holland than in more heterogeneous countries, such as Canada (CPB 1997). To reduce emissions in the transportation sector, the government intends to rely on tax measures that raise the costs of fuel, thereby inducing increased fuel efficiency and less driving, although greater enforcement of speed limits (higher speeds increase fuel use) will also be employed.
However, it appears that, given already high prices due to a variety of taxes, fuel demand may be quite price inelastic, thus reducing the ability of the government to increase efficiency in this sector. Carbon taxes on energy used for heating have also been implemented, but, again, their effectiveness may be limited due to existing efficiencies. Hence, regulation of industry output of non-CO 2 greenhouse gases, as well as CO 2 , continue to feature prominently. Further, the Dutch plan to reduce reliance on coal-generated power and even natural gas, intending instead to purchase hydropower from Norway and nuclear power from France.
Despite a basic package that is designed to reduce CO 2 emissions by the required amount, the Dutch have a backup plan. The main element in this plan is a measure to reduce N 2 O emissions in the chemical industry using a yet-to-be developed technology. This would result in annual reductions of CO 2 -equivalent N 2 O of 10 Mt, or 20% of the total required reduction. In this sense, it behaves much like Canada's claim for clean energy exports -a type of "ace in the hole". However, the backup plan (reserve package) also calls for higher energy taxes, excise duties on motor fuels, and the underground storage of CO 2 .
It is difficult to estimate the costs of attaining the Dutch KP target. If it is assumed that external reductions cost $US 15 per t CO 2 (as above), then half of required Dutch emissions reductions come at a cost of $375 million. The remainder could be achieved through domestic emissions trading and/or taxes at an average cost of $US82.64 per t CO 2 , or total annual cost of $2,066 million (see IPCC, Table TS .4). The total cost would then be $2.44 billion per year.
However, some of the domestic emission reductions will come about at higher cost because regulatory (C&C) measures will be used. Suppose that half of the domestic reduction comes at a cost that is double what it would be if markets (taxes and/or emissions trading) were employed.
The domestic cost would then be $3,099 million and the total cost would be $3.47 billion, or about a billion U.S. dollars higher than if taxes and/or emissions trading alone were used to achieve the domestic target.
If trading occurs among Annex B countries (or even within Europe itself), and the Netherlands were to rely solely on taxes and emissions trading, then the annual domestic costs would be $532 million (=$21.27/t CO 2 × 25 Mt CO 2 ) and yearly total costs would amount to $907 million, resulting in a saving of about $2.5 billion per year compared to the current plan.
It is not clear that the Netherlands can attain its KP target. Emissions have risen despite very high fuel and other taxes, and despite various regulations, restrictions and investments in efficiency improvements, most of which were pursued for reasons related to water and air pollution and congestion on roads rather than to mitigate climate change. Economic growth has resulted in greater demand for environmental amenities, but it has also enabled the Dutch to "afford" higher carbon taxes. The dilemma is that, while higher prices have shifted people into smaller and more efficient vehicles, for example, the income effect has caused them to demand larger, less fuel efficient ones that are then driven farther as well. Hence, it is quite possible that the basic package may not succeed in getting the Dutch to meet their KP target. In the end, unless the economy stagnates, the target may only be met by relying more and more on nuclear and hydro energy, and implementing projects such as the high-cost "Betuwe" rail line that is dedicated to the transport of goods from the Port of Rotterdam to Germany, thus reducing truck traffic (addressing both congestion and pollution). More desperately, the Dutch recognize that they may need to find ways of reducing industry's N 2 O emissions if they are to meet their KP target.
While the Dutch have a well-thought out implementation plan, one that includes a reserve package in case of failure, it relies almost entirely on emission reductions occurring elsewhere, either via the CDM or through the purchase of hydro and nuclear power from other European countries. While permitted under Kyoto, the purchase of hydro and nuclear power hastens the day when Norway and France will need to build more energy generating capacity, which will be difficult to do given environmental opposition to the types of development required. In that sense, the program is a stop-gap, temporary measure, and perhaps even another form of smoke and mirrors. Nonetheless, the Dutch plan appears to be on much firmer ground than those of Canada and Japan.
DISCUSSION
The Kyoto Protocol is a first attempt by nations to agree to and implement a far-reaching agreement to address a global environmental problem. That an agreement was somehow hammered out is rather amazing, but it came at a cost. Rather than tackle the problem of greenhouse gas emissions in a meaningful way, the KP contains provisions that can best be described as smoke and mirrors. Countries can obtain credit for activities that do not reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. These include the potential purchase of "hot air", carbon offset credits for business-as-usual forest management, and temporary carbon sinks, but can be extended to CO 2 emission reductions arising from "fortunate" choice of a base year.
Further, countries are free not to achieve targets because the KP failed to include effective compliance penalties.
What can be learned from the implementation plans of three quite different countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol? First, it will be difficult for each of these countries to achieve their target of reducing CO 2 emissions by six percent. This is particularly true of Canada and Japan whose emissions in 2000 were significantly above what they were in 1990, so much so that, when compared to the U.S. and Australia, one might question whether they should have even ratified the Kyoto Protocol. With emissions in 2000 only some three percent above base year emissions, the Netherlands has a chance of delivering on its commitment, but it will not be a cakewalk.
Japan will be unable to meet its target without significant investments in nuclear facilities, which will raise the ire of the environmental movement and draw opposition from many citizens. Serious emissions reduction by Canada will likely be nothing more than smoke and mirrors, because of specious claims for terrestrial carbon uptake and dubious credits for clean energy exports. Both countries have implementation plans that lack the transparency needed to instill confidence in processes that make a serious attempt to address anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Only the Netherlands appears to have a solid strategy for attaining its KP target, although one that calls for most of the emissions reductions to take place outside the country via the Clean Development Mechanism and increased imports of nuclear and hydropower from elsewhere in Europe. While the Dutch bear the burden, these emissions reductions will likely be unavailable in the future, to be claimed instead by the host country.
Unless technological innovations are forthcoming, the Dutch will be hard pressed to commit to future reductions in greenhouse gas emissions without importing them from abroad.
Of course, if in the end a reasonably functioning market in emission reduction credits and carbon offsets is available and there is enough "hot air" to go around, all countries have the potential to meet their Kyoto obligations. However, the obstacles to such a scenario are many.
First off, such a market may not develop because the institutional barriers are too great (Tietenberg et al. 1998 ). For example, not all countries have legal systems in place that will facilitate permit trading. Further, if hot air is plentiful, countries may chose not to purchase it, because, after all, it constitutes nothing more than a large income transfer that does not affect CO 2 emissions whatsoever. If hot air is not available, the costs of emission/offset trading could be unacceptably high. This is a very probable outcome, given that Russia has embarked on a program of economic development that could bring emissions close to their KP target. Finally, there remains the real possibility that Russia will not ratify Kyoto, in which case the international community will need to begin again to negotiate a climate accord.
On the basis of what was negotiated by the international community and the three case studies, one cannot be optimistic about the chances that the KP will succeed. Whether it does or not, striking a future climate accord will be even more difficult. To mitigate climate change, it will be necessary for countries to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by some one-half of what they were in 1990. Emission reductions on that scale are simply unrealistic, while the ability and will of countries actually to make such significant cuts is likely weak. 2. This might be a conservative estimate, especially given the great reliance on terrestrial sinks.
Using sinks as a guide, a more realistic cost might be $40 per t CO 2 , which would entail annual costs to the government of $1,375 million. 
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